

# Regime Type and Terrorism Revisited:

## The Institutional Determinants of Terrorism

### Supplementary Materials

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## A Appendix: Quantitative Data and Robustness Checks

In this Appendix, we first provide additional details on our measurement of terrorism exposure, the dependent variable. Next, we report the results from a variety of robustness checks to probe the sensitivity of the results reported in the article. Please note that, to distinguish the robustness checks from the main results reported in the paper, we label the models reported in the Appendix with Roman Numerals instead of the standard Arabic numerals.

### A.1 Measuring Terrorism

Our definition terrorism, and coding procedures for including incidents from the GTD, are drawn from [Fortna, Lotito and Rubin \(forthcoming\)](#). To create country-year counts of terrorism incidents, we first require incidents to meet all three of GTD’s inclusion criteria:

1. aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
2. evidence of intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience than the immediate victims;
3. outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (i.e. outside international law, particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting non-combatants).<sup>15</sup>

[Fortna, Lotito and Rubin \(forthcoming\)](#) propose a “less restrictive” and a “more restrictive” definition of terrorism, coded using the attack and target type information from GTD. The less restrictive measure includes the following attack types: hijacking, hostage taking (kidnapping), hostage taking (barricade incident), bombing/explosion, and armed assault.<sup>16</sup> It includes the following target types: business, airports aircraft, educational institutions,

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<sup>15</sup>See the Global Terrorism Database Codebook.

<sup>16</sup>It excludes: assassination, unarmed attack, facility/infrastructure attack and unknown.

food or water supply, private citizens/property, religious figures/institutions, telecommunications, tourists, transportation (other than aviation), and utilities.<sup>17</sup> The more restrictive measure includes only armed assaults and bombings/explosions, excluding all others. It uses the target sub-type variable to include only attacks most likely to be targeting civilians in an indiscriminate manner.

In our main analysis, we modify the less restrictive measure to include attacks with two government (general) target sub-types: election-related and government buildings/facility/office. We add these sub-types specifically because, unlike the other government target sub-types, these targets usually include mainly civilian employees in the public sector, rather than specific political leaders actually responsible for decision-making. Targeting career civil servants is not like targeting individuals or groups that are known government supporters. For example, we would not want to exclude an attack on a post office; though the building is government-owned, the perpetrators are likely targeting civilians in a densely trafficked public place, much like a public square, rather than government employees selectively. The full list of attack and target types included in the main count measure used compared to the less and more restrictive version can be seen in the checklist below.

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<sup>17</sup>It excludes: government (general), police, military, abortion related, government (diplomatic), journalists media, maritime, NGO, other, terrorists/non-state militias, unknown, and violent political parties.

## Attack and Target Types included in TAC's Less and More Restrictive Measures

<b>Attack (attacktype1)</b>		<b>main</b>	<b>less</b>	<b>more</b>	
1	Assassination				
2	Armed Assault	✓	✓	✓	
3	Bombing/Explosion	✓	✓	✓	
4	Hijacking	✓	✓		
5	Hostage Taking (barricade)	✓	✓		
6	Hostage Taking (kidnapping)	✓	✓		
7	Facility/Infrastructure				
8	Unarmed Assault				
9	Unknown				
<b>Target (targtype1)</b>	<b>Target Subtype (targsubtype1)</b>	<b>main</b>	<b>less</b>	<b>more</b>	
1	Business	1 Gas/oil	✓	✓	
		2 Restaurant/Bar/Café	✓	✓	✓
		3 Bank/Commerce	✓	✓	
		4 Multinational Corp.	✓	✓	
		5 Industrial/Textiles/Factories	✓	✓	
		6 Medical/Pharmaceutical	✓	✓	
		7 Retail/Grocery/Bakery	✓	✓	✓
		8 Hotel/Resort	✓	✓	✓
		9 Farm/Ranch	✓	✓	
		10 Mining	✓	✓	
		11 Entertainment/Cultural/Stadiums	✓	✓	✓
		12 Construction	✓	✓	
		13 Private Security Firms	✓	✓	
2	Government (General)	14 Judges/Attorneys/Courts			
		15 Politician or Political Party Movement/Meeting/Rally			
		16 Royalty			
		17 Head of State			
		18 Government Personnel (excluding police, military)			
		19 Election-related	✓		
		20 Intelligence			
		21 Government Buildings/Facility/Office	✓		
3	Police	22-26	[all subtypes]		
4	Military	27-39	[all subtypes]		
5	Abortion related	40-41	[all subtypes]		
6	Airports/Aircraft	42 Aircraft	✓	✓	✓
		43 Airline Officer/Personnel	✓	✓	
		44 Airport	✓	✓	✓
7	Government (Diplomatic)	45-47	[all subtypes]		

8	<i>Educational Institution</i>	48	<i>Teachers/Professors/Instructors</i>	✓	✓	
		49	<i>Schools/Universities/Educ. Buildings</i>	✓	✓	✓
		50	<i>Other Personnel</i>	✓	✓	✓
9	<i>Food &amp; Water Supply</i>	51	<i>Food Supply</i>	✓	✓	✓
		52	<i>Water Supply</i>	✓	✓	✓
10	<i>Journalists/Media</i>	53-56	<i>[all subtypes]</i>			
11	<i>Maritime</i>	57	<i>Civilian Maritime</i>	✓	✓	✓
		58	<i>Commercial Maritime</i>	✓	✓	
		59	<i>Oil Tankers</i>	✓	✓	
		60	<i>Ports</i>	✓	✓	✓
12	<i>NGO</i>	61-62	<i>[all subtypes]</i>			
13	<i>Other</i>	63	<i>Ambulances</i>	✓	✓	
		64	<i>Fire Fighters/Trucks</i>	✓	✓	
		65	<i>Refugee Camps</i>	✓	✓	✓
		66	<i>DMZs</i>	✓	✓	✓
		67	<i>Unnamed Civilians/Unspecified</i>	✓	✓	✓
14	<i>Private Citizens and Property</i>	68	<i>Named Civilians</i>	✓	✓	
		69	<i>Religion Identified</i>	✓	✓	✓
		70	<i>Students</i>	✓	✓	✓
		71	<i>Race/Ethnicity identified</i>	✓	✓	✓
		72	<i>Farmers</i>	✓	✓	✓
		73	<i>Vehicles/Transportation</i>	✓	✓	✓
		74	<i>Marketplace/Plaza/Square</i>	✓	✓	✓
		75	<i>Village/Cities/Towns/Suburb</i>	✓	✓	✓
		76	<i>Houses/Apartments/Residence</i>	✓	✓	✓
		77	<i>Laborers (general)/Specific Jobs</i>	✓	✓	✓
		78	<i>Processions/Gatherings</i>	✓	✓	✓
		79	<i>Public Areas</i>	✓	✓	✓
		80	<i>Memorials/Cemeteries/Monuments</i>	✓	✓	✓
		81	<i>Museums/Cultural Centers</i>	✓	✓	✓
15	<i>Religious Figures Institutions</i>	82	<i>Labor Union Related</i>	✓	✓	
		83	<i>Protestors</i>	✓	✓	
		84	<i>Political Party Members/Rallies</i>	✓	✓	
		85	<i>Religious Figures</i>	✓	✓	
		86	<i>Places of Worship</i>	✓	✓	✓
16	<i>Telecommunications</i>	87	<i>Affiliated Institutions</i>	✓	✓	✓
		88-92	<i>[all subtypes]</i>	✓	✓	
17	<i>Terrorists/Non-State Militias</i>	93-94	<i>[all subtypes]</i>			
18	<i>Tourists</i>	95	<i>Tourism Travel Agency</i>	✓	✓	✓
		96	<i>Tour Bus/Vehicle</i>	✓	✓	✓
		97	<i>Tourists</i>	✓	✓	✓
		98	<i>Other Facility</i>	✓	✓	✓

19	<i>Transportation</i>	99	<i>Bus (excluding tourist)</i>	✓	✓	✓
		100	<i>Train/Train Tracks/Trolley</i>	✓	✓	✓
		101	<i>Bus Station/Stop</i>	✓	✓	✓
		102	<i>Subway</i>	✓	✓	✓
		103	<i>Bridge/Car Tunnel</i>	✓	✓	✓
		104	<i>Highway/Road/Toll/Traffic Signal</i>	✓	✓	✓
		105	<i>Taxi/Rickshaw</i>	✓	✓	✓
20	<i>Unknown</i>	NA				
21	<i>Utilities</i>	106	<i>Gas</i>	✓	✓	
		107	<i>Electric</i>	✓	✓	
		108	<i>Oil</i>	✓	✓	
22	<i>Violent Political Parties</i>	NA				

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## A.2 Using GPS 2017 Data

Table 2: Analysis Using GPS (2017) Data, DV = Transnational Terrorism

	GPS 2017		V-Dem		
Polity	9.17***				
	(1.78)				
Polity Sq.	-7.64***				
	(1.57)				
Lib. Democracy		4.76***			
		(1.62)			
Lib. Democracy Sq.		-5.64***			
		(1.99)			
Civil Lib.			4.43		
			(2.57)		
Civil Lib. Sq.			-5.30*		
			(2.22)		
Political Lib.			4.79***	4.73***	
			(0.97)	(0.96)	
Private Lib.			-1.66*	-1.78*	
			(0.75)	(0.75)	
Phys. Integrity			-3.70***	-3.57***	
			(0.81)	(0.79)	
Clean Elections		0.51	-0.77	0.41	
		(1.19)	(0.52)	(0.97)	
Clean Elections Sq.		-0.71		-1.35	
		(1.38)		(1.00)	
Residual Deviance:	907.51 on	909.65 on	909.47 on	903.53 on	902.72 on
	873 <sub>DF</sub>	870 <sub>DF</sub>	867 <sub>DF</sub>	867 <sub>DF</sub>	866 <sub>DF</sub>
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses					
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$					

Table 2 presents the results comparing the results in Gaibulloev, Piazza and Sandler (2017) to the results using their data and model specification—including their measure of transnational terrorism, their control measures, and the 5-year period unit of observation—but substituting V-Dem variables in the model. The replication investigates the effect of the aggregate Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), which includes both the procedural/institutional component of democracy (clean elections) as well as the liberal component (especially civil liberties protections). The “inverted-U” relationship between regime type and terrorism holds up using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index in their data.

The second replication breaks LDI into the constituent elements: the (aggregate) civil liberties index (CLI) and the clean elections index (CEI). The direction of coefficient estimates on CLI and its squared term are consistent with an inverted-U relationship between civil liberties and terrorism, but not statistically distinguishable from 0. Finally, the third replication breaks civil liberties down further into its components: political liberties, private liberties, and physical integrity. The coefficient estimates are consistent with the main hypotheses, and with the results reported using our preferred data and specification. Table ??

Table 2, continued (Controls)

	GPS 2017	V-Dem			
Alliances	1.17*** (0.25)	1.03*** (0.23)	0.90*** (0.24)	0.76*** (0.25)	0.83*** (0.25)
Interventions	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.16)
Crisis	0.81*** (0.18)	0.78*** (0.20)	0.72*** (0.21)	0.72*** (0.18)	0.72*** (0.18)
Durable	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Civil War	0.38*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.42*** (0.08)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)
Discrim. pop.	1.91*** (0.66)	1.83** (0.67)	1.67* (0.75)	1.90*** (0.56)	1.92*** (0.57)
mlinc	0.13 (0.10)	0.03 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.13)
log GDP pop	0.63*** (0.10)	0.59*** (0.13)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.42*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)
CINC	-7.05 (5.69)	-7.00 (6.99)	-5.02 (6.80)	-0.25 (6.33)	0.24 (6.32)
meglob	-0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
mpglob	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.26 (0.39)	-0.40 (0.43)	-0.15 (0.38)	-0.34 (0.31)	-0.38 (0.31)
Africa	-1.36*** (0.31)	-1.56*** (0.35)	-1.86*** (0.30)	-1.57*** (0.29)	-1.59*** (0.29)
Americas	-0.40 (0.30)	-0.32 (0.32)	-0.22 (0.34)	-0.32 (0.37)	-0.40 (0.38)
MENA	0.02 (0.39)	-0.30 (0.51)	-0.62 (0.49)	-0.32 (0.40)	-0.39 (0.39)
Asia	-1.23*** (0.26)	-1.20*** (0.31)	-1.28*** (0.30)	-0.81* (0.32)	-0.86** (0.31)
Intercept	-6.17*** (1.03)	-4.06*** (1.14)	-4.55*** (1.24)	-3.09** (1.14)	-3.26*** (1.16)
Residual Deviance:	907.51 on 873 <sub>DF</sub>	909.65 on 870 <sub>DF</sub>	909.47 on 867 <sub>DF</sub>	903.53 on 867 <sub>DF</sub>	902.72 on 866 <sub>DF</sub>
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses					
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$					

reports the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the control variables.

### A.3 Disaggregating Regime Type: Elections, Horizontal Accountability, and Civil Liberties

Table 3: Terrorism and Regime Type Component Institutions

	Model i	Model ii	Model iii
Lib. Democracy	5.59*** (1.87)		
Lib. Democracy Sq.	-6.58*** (1.82)		
Civil Lib.		5.56* (2.49)	5.12*** (1.06)
Civil Lib. Sq.		-7.49*** (2.27)	-7.07*** (0.87)
Clean Elections		-0.66 (1.01)	-0.12 (0.26)
Clean Elections Sq.		0.69 (1.48)	
Horiz. Accountability		3.56*** (0.75)	3.65*** (0.38)
Residual Deviance:	4997.13 on 7159 DF	5016.82 on 7156 DF	5015.33 on 7157 DF
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year			
All Models include controls for GTD data collection period (results not reported).			
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$			

Next, we carry out the analyses sequentially breaking down regime type into its components using our preferred data and model specification. Table 3 presents the results. Model *i* uses the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), while Models *ii* and *iii* use the clean elections (CEI), horizontal accountability, and (aggregate) civil liberties (CLI) as separate measures.



## A.4 Disaggregating Civil Liberties: Political Liberties, Private Liberties, and Physical Integrity

Table 4: Terrorism and Civil Liberties Component Institutions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model iv	Model v	Model vi	Model vii
Political Civ. Lib.	5.22*** (0.98)	5.26*** (1.00)	10.37*** (1.63)	5.60*** (0.91)	5.23*** (1.01)	7.98*** (2.41)
Political Civ. Lib. <sup>2</sup>			-5.36*** (1.25)			-2.60 (2.07)
Private Civ. Lib.	-1.64 (0.93)	-1.77 (0.93)	-2.17* (0.94)	4.16* (1.64)	-2.09* (0.92)	1.98 (2.51)
Private Civ. Lib. <sup>2</sup>				-6.53*** (1.36)		-4.52* (2.19)
Physical Integrity	-4.40*** (0.63)	-4.41*** (0.62)	-4.16*** (0.61)	-4.24*** (0.63)	-0.58 (1.54)	-3.24 (1.80)
Physical Integrity <sup>2</sup>					-3.95** (1.51)	-0.94 (1.78)
Clean Elections	-0.91* (0.46)	0.21 (0.90)	-0.60 (0.51)	-0.62 (0.46)	-0.72 (0.52)	-0.48 (0.48)
Clean Elections <sup>2</sup>		-1.35 (1.04)				
Horiz. Accountability	1.54* (0.71)	1.78* (0.71)	1.88* (0.81)	1.49* (0.70)	1.77* (0.82)	1.70* (0.76)
Residual Deviance:	5081.52 on 7156 <sub>DF</sub>	5080.32 on 7155 <sub>DF</sub>	5078.82 on 7155 <sub>DF</sub>	5090.18 on 7155 <sub>DF</sub>	5080.86 on 7155 <sub>DF</sub>	5085.32 on 7153 <sub>DF</sub>
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year						
All Models include controls for GTD data collection period (results not reported).						
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$						

Next, we explore a number of alternative specifications using the component civil liberties dimensions: political civil liberties, private civil liberties, and physical integrity. Table 4 presents the results cycling through versions in which we allow each component dimension, in turn, to be non-monotonic (include the squared term). Table 5 reports the results cycling through allowing each component's effect to vary conditional on the clean elections index.

Table 4, continued (Controls)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model iv	Model v	Model vi	Model vii
GDP Per Cap. (log)	0.25** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.10)	0.33*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)
Population (log)	0.78*** (0.05)	0.78*** (0.06)	0.79*** (0.06)	0.77*** (0.06)	0.76*** (0.06)	0.77*** (0.07)
NATO	0.25 (0.37)	0.33 (0.41)	0.43 (0.42)	0.43 (0.40)	0.44 (0.41)	0.49 (0.44)
Discrimination	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)
MENA	1.15* (0.47)	1.10* (0.50)	0.73 (0.44)	0.53 (0.41)	0.78 (0.41)	0.43 (0.40)
Africa	-0.59* (0.29)	-0.58* (0.29)	-0.70* (0.29)	-0.70** (0.26)	-0.66* (0.27)	-0.75** (0.27)
North America	-2.51*** (0.28)	-2.54*** (0.29)	-2.71*** (0.34)	-2.60*** (0.32)	-2.70*** (0.33)	-2.70*** (0.35)
South/Central America	0.89** (0.34)	0.89** (0.34)	0.88* (0.37)	0.80* (0.36)	0.90* (0.37)	0.81* (0.38)
Asia	-0.09 (0.35)	-0.13 (0.34)	-0.24 (0.32)	-0.26 (0.33)	-0.25 (0.32)	-0.33 (0.32)
Civil War	1.80*** (0.18)	1.81*** (0.18)	1.81*** (0.19)	1.88*** (0.19)	1.81*** (0.18)	1.88*** (0.20)
Intercept	-13.61*** (1.27)	-14.01*** (1.27)	-15.01*** (1.32)	-15.06*** (1.34)	-14.34*** (1.34)	-15.40*** (1.38)
Residual Deviance:	5081.52 on 7156 DF	5080.32 on 7155 DF	5078.82 on 7155 DF	5090.18 on 7155 DF	5080.86 on 7155 DF	
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year						
All Models include controls for GTD data collection period (results not reported).						
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$						

## A.5 Alternative Dependent Variable Measures

To check whether our results are sensitive to the attack and target types included as terrorism incidents in the count, we modify Model 1 using alternative measures of terrorism and report the results in Table 6. The first column reports the main results for comparison. The second and third columns report the results using the less restrictive and more restrictive definition of terrorism, respectively, in which we use the GTD attack and target information as detailed above.

The fourth column uses only “domestic” terrorism; using the count of terrorism incidents that not only fit our definition of terrorism, but are also recorded in GTD with the target’s nationality matching the country location. This measure weeds out incidents that target the country abroad, such as attacks on an embassy abroad. This measure may be relevant because the mechanisms linking political institutions to a country’s exposure to terrorism

Table 5: Civil Liberties Component Institutions Interacted with Clean Elections

	Model 1	Model 2	Model viii	Model ix	Model x
Political Civ. Lib.	5.22*** (0.98)	5.26*** (1.00)	6.27*** (0.97)	5.55*** (0.97)	5.31*** (0.99)
Political Civ. Lib.*CEI			-2.85*** (0.89)		
Private Civ. Lib.	-1.64 (0.93)	-1.77 (0.93)	-1.88* (0.91)	-0.99 (0.98)	-1.91* (0.92)
Private Civ. Lib.*CEI				-3.85*** (1.06)	
Physical Integrity	-4.40*** (0.63)	-4.41*** (0.62)	-4.40*** (0.62)	-4.34*** (0.61)	-3.55*** (0.73)
Physical Integrity*CEI					-2.64** (1.03)
Clean Elections	-0.91* (0.46)	0.21 (0.90)	0.79 (0.72)	1.57 (0.89)	0.60 (0.86)
Clean Elections <sup>2</sup>		-1.35 (1.04)			
Horiz. Accountability	1.54* (0.71)	1.78* (0.71)	1.80* (0.79)	1.68* (0.74)	1.85* (0.77)
Residual Deviance:	5081.52 on 7156 DF	5080.32 on 7155 DF	5084.1 on 7155 DF	5084.81 on 7155 DF	5080.59 on 7155 DF
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year All Models include controls for GTD data collection period (results not reported). Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$					

run partially through the citizens' willingness to support or tolerate extremists using violence within their communities, which allows these groups to organize and operate in the country of origin to carry out attacks. The measure does not completely separate transnational from domestic terrorism, as incidents perpetrated by local cells of foreign extremist groups operating within the country are included in the count. Unfortunately, GTD does not include incident-level information that would allow a reliable way for distinguishing these types of transnational attacks.

The results are substantively identical across the models and consistent with the hypotheses.

Table 5, continued (Controls)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model viii	Model ix	Model x
GDP Per Cap. (log)	0.25** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.31*** (0.10)	0.32*** (0.10)	0.31*** (0.09)
Population (log)	0.78*** (0.05)	0.78*** (0.06)	0.78*** (0.06)	0.78*** (0.06)	0.77*** (0.06)
NATO	0.25 (0.37)	0.33 (0.41)	0.39 (0.42)	0.43 (0.41)	0.38 (0.41)
Discrimination	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)
MENA	1.15* (0.47)	1.10* (0.50)	0.95 (0.49)	0.76 (0.42)	0.90 (0.46)
Africa	-0.59* (0.29)	-0.58* (0.29)	-0.63* (0.30)	-0.66* (0.28)	-0.63* (0.29)
North America	-2.51*** (0.28)	-2.54*** (0.29)	-2.61*** (0.31)	-2.60*** (0.32)	-2.58*** (0.31)
South/Central America	0.89** (0.34)	0.89** (0.34)	0.87* (0.36)	0.83* (0.36)	0.84* (0.37)
Asia	-0.09 (0.35)	-0.13 (0.34)	-0.20 (0.33)	-0.22 (0.34)	-0.23 (0.33)
Civil War	1.80*** (0.18)	1.81*** (0.18)	1.83*** (0.19)	1.88*** (0.19)	1.82*** (0.18)
Intercept	-13.61*** (1.27)	-14.01*** (1.27)	-14.48*** (1.31)	-14.52*** (1.33)	-14.26*** (1.31)
Residual Deviance:	5081.52 on 7156 DF	5080.32 on 7155 DF	5084.1 on 7155 DF	5084.81 on 7155 DF	
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year					
All Models include controls for GTD data collection period (results not reported).					
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$					

## A.6 Alternative Confounders

Table 7 presents additional alternative specifications for Model 1, including alternative possible confounders. Because the American military presence in Iraq starting in 2003 and the expanded War on Terror altered the international security landscape and may have altered the incentives to target Western allied states with terrorism, we include a dummy variable for all Iraq-years 2003 through the end of the panel. We also fit Model 1, substituting the NATO membership indicator with an indicator for whether the country is an ally of the United States. The substantive interpretations of the results remain identical with these alternative covariates included in the model.

Table 6: Negative Binomial Model Results

	Model 1	T Less	T More	T Domestic
Political Civ. Lib.	5.22*** (0.98)	5.18*** (1.00)	5.28*** (1.14)	5.28*** (1.07)
Private Civ. Lib.	-1.64 (0.93)	-1.63 (0.95)	-1.57 (1.03)	-1.62 (0.99)
Physical Integrity	-4.40*** (0.63)	-4.45*** (0.64)	-4.59*** (0.69)	-4.55*** (0.67)
Clean Elections	-0.91* (0.46)	-0.89 (0.46)	-0.54 (0.52)	-0.91 (0.47)
Horiz. Accountability	1.54* (0.71)	1.57* (0.73)	1.32 (0.76)	1.44 (0.79)
Residual Deviance:	5081.52 on 7156 <sub>DF</sub>	4994.36 on 7156 <sub>DF</sub>	4254.03 on 7156 <sub>DF</sub>	4641.29 on 7156 <sub>DF</sub>
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year				
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$				

All Models include the following controls: log GDP per capita, log Population, NATO membership, Discriminated population, civil war incidence, regional controls, GTD data collection period, and an Intercept.

Table 7: Negative Binomial Model with Alternative Confounders

	w/ US ally	w/ Iraq 2003
Political Civ. Lib.	4.90*** (0.98)	5.27*** (0.99)
Private Civ. Lib.	-1.43 (0.94)	-1.67 (0.94)
Physical Integrity	-4.13*** (0.69)	-4.38*** (0.64)
Clean Elections	-0.88 (0.48)	-0.92 (0.47)
Horiz. Accountability	1.77* (0.76)	1.49* (0.72)
Residual Deviance:	4543.19 on 6472 <sub>DF</sub>	5083.73 on 7155 <sub>DF</sub>
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year		
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$		

## A.7 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model Results

Because terrorism is a rare event, we also fit a zero-inflated negative binomial model, regressing the main incident count on the full battery of covariates included in Models 1 and 2. The results are substantively similar to the simpler negative binomial specification.

Table 8: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model Results

	ZINB 1 (Count)	ZINB 1 (Inflation)	ZINB 2 (Count)	ZINB 2 (Inflation)
Political Civ. Lib.	3.83** (1.42)	-4.36 (2.29)	3.78** (1.43)	-4.26* (1.99)
Private Civ. Lib.	-1.73* (0.83)	0.50 (1.12)	-1.93** (0.74)	0.35 (1.01)
Physical Integrity	-4.24*** (0.62)	1.14 (1.22)	-4.14*** (0.61)	1.36 (1.04)
Clean Elections	-0.69 (0.43)	0.25 (0.69)	0.84 (1.13)	0.45 (2.25)
Clean Elections <sup>2</sup>			-1.79 (1.32)	-0.20 (2.58)
Horiz. Accountability	1.79 (1.22)	0.51 (2.42)	2.08 (1.23)	0.44 (2.35)

Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses  
Predictors Lagged One Year  
Statistically significant at: \* =  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\* =  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\* =  $p \leq 0.005$

The coefficient on physical integrity protections is negative in the count model (greater physical integrity, fewer terrorism incidents) and positive in the the zero-inflation model (greater physical integrity, higher probability of zero incidents). The coefficient estimates are statistically distinguishable from 0 in the count model for both versions and the coefficient estimates in the zero-inflation model are not significant in either. This may suggest physical integrity protections affect the volume of terrorism rather than the probability that the state experiences any terrorism at all.

The coefficient estimate on political civil liberties is positive in the count model (greater political civil liberties protection, more terrorism events) and negative in the zero-inflation model (greater civil liberties protection, lower probability of zero incidents). The coefficient estimate in the count model are statistically distinguishable from 0 in the count model both with and without the squared term for clean elections, though the coefficient estimate in the zero-inflation model is only statistically distinguishable from 0 in the model including the squared term for clean elections.

The coefficient estimate on private civil liberties is negative in the count model and positive in the zero-inflation model, consistent with the pattern for physical integrity rights and with the findings in the main analysis reported in the paper.

## A.8 Checking Sensitivity to Collinearity in Civil Liberties Component Dimensions

To check whether the results may be sensitive to collinearity in the civil liberties component dimensions, we re-fit Model 1 dropping each component dimension separately and including each component by itself, in sequence (Models 1A-1F). As Table 9 shows, the coefficient estimates for each component civil liberties dimension are consistent across specifications. The only partial exception is Private liberties, for which the coefficient estimates are not statistically distinguishable from 0 in two of the model iterations. But, for the most part the direction of the effect is consistent. Though this approach is imperfect, it boosts confidence that the results are robust to collinearity in the component dimensions.

Table 9: Modifying Model 1 to Check Sensitivity to Collinearity

	Model 1	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 1C	Model 1D	Model 1E	Model 1F
Political Civ. Lib.	5.22*** (0.98)	3.60*** (0.98)	4.28*** (0.57)		2.06*** (0.64)		
Private Civ. Lib.	-1.64 (0.93)	-2.33* (1.08)		0.57 (0.60)		-0.65 (0.78)	
Physical Integrity	-4.40*** (0.63)		-4.62*** (0.67)	-3.24*** (0.62)			-3.03*** (0.61)
Residual Deviance:	5081.52 on 7156 <sub>DF</sub>	5014.16 on 7157 <sub>DF</sub>	5072.4 on 7157 <sub>DF</sub>	5036.02 on 7157 <sub>DF</sub>	5004.61 on 7158 <sub>DF</sub>	5002.1 on 7158 <sub>DF</sub>	5033.53 on 7158 <sub>DF</sub>
Country-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses Predictors Lagged One Year							
Statistically significant at: * = $p \leq 0.05$ ; ** = $p \leq 0.01$ ; *** = $p \leq 0.005$							

All Models include the following controls: log GDP per capita, log Population, NATO membership, Discriminated population, civil war incidence, regional controls, GTD data collection period, and an Intercept (results reported in Appendix).