On this page, you will find updated drafts of my publications and working papers, details on additional works in progress, as well as a copy of my doctoral dissertation.
You may also visit my Google Scholar Page.
You may also visit my Google Scholar Page.
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Download my research statement to learn more about my research agenda: |
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Peer-Reviewed Publications:
"Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil Wars: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines," Forthcoming Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Suggested Citation: Rubin, Michael A. "Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines," forthcoming Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Pre-print available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3290760
Pre-print available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3290760
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Under what conditions do rebel organizations control territory during civil war? How do civilians influence the distribution of territorial control? This article introduces a civilian agency theory, emphasizing the importance of community collective action capacity (CAC) defined by underlying social network structure, to complement existing explanations of territorial control in civil war. It argues communities with greater CAC mobilize information and resources more efficiently, increasing belligerents’ incentives to control territory. However, CAC also increases community bargaining power to demand costly investments in governance and protection, partially offsetting these expected gains. CAC increases rebel control in areas of state neglect. But, as community access to state services increases, communities leverage CAC to demand prohibitively costly rebel governance, deterring rebel control. The article tests the theory using novel village-level data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. Annual military intelligence reports from 2011-2014 measure communist insurgent territorial control and social network analysis of a household-level census (2008-2010) measures community CAC. Multilevel logit regression results are consistent with the theory. Qualitative analysis of key-informant interviews from 75 randomly selected villages in conflict-affected Eastern Mindanao illustrates the causal mechanisms and tests against plausible alternative explanations.
Research supported by the National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, Award Number: 1535598). Support also provided by the Earth Institute's AC4 program, the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, and the Columbia University Political Science Department.
Research supported by the National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, Award Number: 1535598). Support also provided by the Earth Institute's AC4 program, the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, and the Columbia University Political Science Department.
"Don't Bite the Hand that Feeds: Rebel Funding Sources and the Use of Terrorism," (with V. Page Fortna and Nicholas Lotito). International Studies Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 4, December 2018, Pages 782–794.
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Link to article on ISQ's Website: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy038
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Why do some rebel groups resort to terrorism tactics, while others refrain from doing so? This paper argues that rebel organizations pay attention to the legitimacy costs associated with terrorism and that how rebel organizations finance their rebellion creates variation in their vulnerability to these legitimacy costs. Organizations that rely primarily on civilian support, and to a lesser extent on foreign support, are most constrained in their use of terrorism. Rebels who finance their fight with lootable resources such as gems or drugs are least vulnerable to legitimacy costs and so are more likely to resort to terrorism and to employ more of it. The paper develops legitimacy cost theory and tests it using new data on Terrorism in Armed Conflict from 1970 to 2007. We find robust support for the hypothesis that groups who finance their fight with natural resources are significantly more likely to employ terrorism (though not necessarily to conduct more deadly attacks) relative to those who rely on local civilian support. We find that groups with external sources of financing, such as foreign state support, may be more likely to engage in terrorism than those who rely on local civilians, but not significantly so.
Under Review and Working Papers:
"Terrorism and the Varieties of Civil Liberties," (with Richard K. Morgan), Under Review.
Rubin, Michael A. and Morgan, Richard K. Terrorism and the Varieties of Civil Liberties (March 27, 2019). Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3361330
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How do government protections of, and infringement upon, its citizens’ civil liberties influence the country’s exposure to terrorism? Existing research remains divided on whether civil liberties protections increase or decrease vulnerability to terrorism, and the conditions under which violating civil liberties mitigate or exacerbate the security threats associated with terrorism. We provide clarity on these debates by disaggregating civil liberties into component dimensions—political liberties, private liberties, and physical integrity—which we argue have distinct effects on a country’s exposure to terrorism. We argue political liberties increase terrorism while physical integrity rights decrease terrorism. These countervailing effects provide an alternative explanation for the“inverted-U”relationship between civil liberties protections and terrorism. We isolate the effects of specific political institutional features and government behaviors by leveraging the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data. We measure a country’s exposure to terrorism using the Global Terrorism Database. Our sample covers 176 states from 1970-2016. We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses regarding the effects of the distinct component dimensions of civil liberties.
"Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC): Introducing a New Data Set on Terrorism in Civil Conflicts, 1970-2012," (with V. Page Fortna and Nicholas Lotito), Under Review.
The Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC) data collection project, developed with Page Fortna (Columbia University) and Nicholas Lotito (Yale University), links violent incidents in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to civil war combatants included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) datasets, filling a crucial gap in existing empirical studies addressing the causes and consequences of terrorism. Existing research has relied upon data that includes only groups that have committed acts of terrorism without including similar groups that may use terrorism but do not. This limits the set of testable research questions and confidence in inferences regarding the strategic use of terrorism. We consider civil war belligerents a useful sample of potential users of terrorism and investigate research questions related to strategies of conflict and the use of terrorism in civil wars. Upcoming papers using TAC data contribute to the literature on the causes and consequences of Terrorism in civil wars, rebel group lethality and conflict intensity, and strategic choice between guerrilla and civilian targeting tactics.
Works in Progress:
"Interstate Conflict Interdependence and State Sponsorship of Rebel Groups."
Under what conditions do states sponsor nonstate dissident organizations in conflict with another state? With the observed decline of interstate war, states have increasingly adopted "gray zone" strategies short of militarization to prosecute international disputes while minimizing the risk of conflict escalation. Existing research focuses on the triadic relationship involving two states and a nonstate proxy agent. This article emphasizes the international factors shaping states' willingness to accept the risks associated with sponsorship. When multiple state challengers seek competing concessions from the same adversary (conflict interdependence), each challenger is pressured into seeking to sponsor dissidents in order to maintain their bargaining position with the adversary relative to other challengers; fearing avoiding or delaying sponsorship permits other challengers to capture the limited "labor supply" of resistance. The theory is tested in a regression framework, using San-Akca's (2016) Dangerous Dyads and Berkowitz's Delegating Terror data on external support for violent groups. Introducing a new latent variable measure of interstate disputes, leveraging existing datasets on international conflict alongside global events data to identify lower-intensity disputes relevant to gray zone conflict, the article captures interstate conflict interdependence in the form of competition for target concessions.
"Explaining Civilian Resistance to Statebuilding Campaigns: Evidence from Israel's War for Independence," with Daniel Arnon and Richard McAlexander.
Under what conditions do civilians resist state-building campaigns in the territory in which they reside? Though most territory is under a state’s de jure sovereignty, significant swathes of territory continue to remain contested, by other states or domestic challengers, with substantial implications for the civilians living in contested territory. A robust literature has focused on the interaction between organized warring parties (states, insurgents, warlords, etc.) in statebuilding conflicts. This article contributes to the growing research agenda emphasizing civilian agency as an important factor explaining conflict processes. We argue that social cohesion plays an important role in explaining the local-level variation in communities’ responses to statebuilding encroachment, by empowering communities to collectively resist or retain autonomy in the new order. The argument is tested in the context of the 1948 war in Mandate Palestine (Israel’s independence/Palestinian Nakba) drawing upon detailed data on the proximate causes for de-population in each Arab Palestinian village in which it occurred (Morris 1984 and Khalidi 2006) and new original data coded from a pre-war village-level survey that assessed the social, political, and economic conditions of Arab communities in Palestine conducted by the Jewish forces, provided to the authors by the Haganah archives.
"Does Rebel Service Provision Enable Terrorism?"
Recent scholarship has exposed that, contrary to common perceptions, organizations perpetrating terrorism also frequently provide goods and services to the marginalized communities they purport to represent. Why do some rebel organizations perpetrate acts of terrorism while others do not? What costs do rebels incur when using terrorism, what steps do they take to minimize these costs, and under what conditions do such cost-cutting efforts enable them to perpetrate terrorism? Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the coincidence of terrorism and service provision, but data limitations have hampered systematic empirical comparisons across large samples of rebel organizations to test theories of organization-level variation in the use of terrorism and service provision. This article articulates a legitimacy costs theory to explain the empirical relationship between rebel service provision and use of terrorism and tests it against alternative theories using the new Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC) dataset and Stewart’s (2018) data on rebel organizations’ health and education service provision.
"Concede with Caution: How Concessions Affect Self-Determination Movement Fragmentation," with Nora Keller.
Under what conditions can negotiation foster peace? How does bargaining in intrastate conflict impact the organizational structure of political opposition movements? This article advances a theory to explain political movement fragmentation during self-determination conflicts. We argue that political concessions to heterogeneous self-determination movements may have the unintended consequence of prolonging armed conflict by increasing the risk of organizational fracture. Politically marginalized factions within the movement are more likely to spoil the peace through (renewed) violence in order to avoid entrenching their subordinate political status in the post-conflict order. We test the theory using data on concessions to 146 self-determination movements in 77 countries from 1960-2005 (Cunningham 2014, Cunningham, Dahl and Fruge 2017). Ethnic Power Relations data identifying language and religious cleavages (Bormann, Cederman and Vogt 2017) and Minorities at Risk data enumerating politically and socially relevant ethnic groups measure the within-movement cleavage structure along which fragmentation may occur.
"Named Entities in the Social Sciences (NESS)-Political Organizations: Introducing a New Dataset," with Rex Douglass, Thomas Scherer, and Wakako Maekawa.
A Global Dataset of Non-Government Political Organizations based on Wikidata. We link existing social science datasets to their Wikidata items and use the information from these datasets and from Wikidata/Wikipedia in a Latent Variable Model to measure the extent to which each of the approximately 53 million Wikidata items fits our definition of Non-Government Political Organization. The sample will be used for further data collection and will be useful for researchers investigating questions related to political competition and conflict.
"Named Entities in the Social Sciences (NESS)-Political Organizations: Genealogy, Alliances, and Rivalries," with Rex Douglass, and Thomas Scherer.
NESS-Political Organizations introduces a dataset of politically relevant organizations. This paper describes and implements the procedure to identify important relationships between organizations, useful for scholars interested in leveraging the dataset to investigate a variety of research questions related to political competition and conflict. Using machine-learning tools to extract and summarize information from the Wikidata and Wikipedia knowledge base, we estimate the genealogical connections between distinct Wikidata items as well as additional edge relationships; including alliances and rivalries between organizaitons.
Dissertation:
Rebel Territorial Control, Governance, and Political Accountability in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines
- Permanent URL
- Research supported by the National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, (Award Number: 1535598). Support also provided by the Earth Institute's AC4 program, the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, and the Columbia University Political Science Department.
| rubin_michael_dissertation_manuscript.pdf |
Under what conditions do rebel organizations successfully control territory, and under what conditions do they provide governance, during civil war? Under what conditions do non-combatants influence the spread and conduct of insurgency? The accountability theory of rebel conduct introduces a new unifying framework for understanding rebel groups’ territorial control, governance, and strategic use of violence during civil war. Though existing literature has explored in depth the consequences of local-level variation in territorial control for civil war violence and outcomes, little is known about the origins of territorial control despite obvious relevance to the escalation and perpetuation of intrastate conflict. Crucially, the process by which insurgency expands or contracts represents the crucial first stage that determines the context in which belligerents make subsequent decisions in the conduct of war. Failure to consider the determinants of rebel territorial control, then, presents clear inferential challenges for existing theories of insurgent and counterinsurgent behavior. By emphasizing rebel accountability to civilians, the project contributes to the existing literature by emphasizing the role of non-combatants to explain the origins of rebel territorial control.
The accountability theory argues that community collective action capacity, the ability to mobilize collective action to pursue common interests, influences rebel territorial control and conduct during intrastate conflict. Collective action capacity represents a mobilization technology: communities efficiently form political committees, gather resources and supplies, and monitor individuals’ collaboration with insurgents and/or counterinsurgents. Because of these concomitant advantages,
belligerents have incentives to control territory in which communities enjoy high collective action capacity. However, collective action capacity empowers communities to leverage belligerents’ dependence on their collaboration to demand higher standards of governance and protection from violence. Because governance is costly, collective action capacity may cut against belligerents’ benefits to territorial control. Whether collective action capacity encourages or deters rebel territorial control depends on the community’s alternatives to rebel control; outside options, including alignment with the state or mobilization of autonomy/self-protection strategies, determine community bargaining power to demand rebel investment in governance. Collective action capacity increases rebel control where the state or local power brokers cannot provide basic services and security from civil war violence. The community accepts rebel control at low levels of governance, so rebels’ surplus benefits associated with local collaboration outweigh the expected governance costs. Communities with more effective state or local governance enjoy greater bargaining power to demand rebel governance that may become prohibitively expensive; collective action capacity deters rebel territorial control.
The empirical strategy draws upon complementary quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the extent to which the theoretical predictions are consistent with evidence from the Philippines. First, I present and econometric analysis on nation-wide, village-level data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) military intelligence assessments from 2011- 2014 categorize villages based on the sophistication of organized networks of support for the communist insurgency, and on the New People’s Army (NPA) capabilities to attack military and police units with precision. The reports are designed for internal use, but were generously supplied by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process for research purposes. To measure village collective action capacity, I construct family networks from a government census conducted during 2008-2010, using household head family names. In the Philippines, kinship represents the primary currency of social capital, providing the foundation for the clientelist networks that distribute economic resources and drive political competition. In 1849, the Spanish colonial Governor, facing difficulty tracking household tax contributions, directed local officials to assign unique surnames to each family in their municipality using a list of approved family names. This peculiar history of name reassignment along with strict naming conventions suggests households sharing a surname within the same municipality can be confidently identified as members of the same family line, which allows identification of kinship networks. In the Philippines, collective action capacity increases the level of NPA control in villages with a history of state neglect, while the effect declines as the quality of local governance increases, consistent with the theory. I investigate potential threats to the inferences associated with endogeneity bias and test the theory’s mechanisms by investigating the relationship between collective action capacity and rebel governance in qualitative data collected in a Key-Informant survey of local leaders in 75 randomly selected villages within 3 conflict-affected provinces (Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Compostela Valley) on the island of Mindanao. I present plausible alternative theories, consistent with the econometric results, and draw competing hypotheses regarding variation in rebel governance. I use the interview data in process-tracing and case comparison methods to adjudicate between the accountability theory and these alternatives.
The accountability theory argues that community collective action capacity, the ability to mobilize collective action to pursue common interests, influences rebel territorial control and conduct during intrastate conflict. Collective action capacity represents a mobilization technology: communities efficiently form political committees, gather resources and supplies, and monitor individuals’ collaboration with insurgents and/or counterinsurgents. Because of these concomitant advantages,
belligerents have incentives to control territory in which communities enjoy high collective action capacity. However, collective action capacity empowers communities to leverage belligerents’ dependence on their collaboration to demand higher standards of governance and protection from violence. Because governance is costly, collective action capacity may cut against belligerents’ benefits to territorial control. Whether collective action capacity encourages or deters rebel territorial control depends on the community’s alternatives to rebel control; outside options, including alignment with the state or mobilization of autonomy/self-protection strategies, determine community bargaining power to demand rebel investment in governance. Collective action capacity increases rebel control where the state or local power brokers cannot provide basic services and security from civil war violence. The community accepts rebel control at low levels of governance, so rebels’ surplus benefits associated with local collaboration outweigh the expected governance costs. Communities with more effective state or local governance enjoy greater bargaining power to demand rebel governance that may become prohibitively expensive; collective action capacity deters rebel territorial control.
The empirical strategy draws upon complementary quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the extent to which the theoretical predictions are consistent with evidence from the Philippines. First, I present and econometric analysis on nation-wide, village-level data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) military intelligence assessments from 2011- 2014 categorize villages based on the sophistication of organized networks of support for the communist insurgency, and on the New People’s Army (NPA) capabilities to attack military and police units with precision. The reports are designed for internal use, but were generously supplied by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process for research purposes. To measure village collective action capacity, I construct family networks from a government census conducted during 2008-2010, using household head family names. In the Philippines, kinship represents the primary currency of social capital, providing the foundation for the clientelist networks that distribute economic resources and drive political competition. In 1849, the Spanish colonial Governor, facing difficulty tracking household tax contributions, directed local officials to assign unique surnames to each family in their municipality using a list of approved family names. This peculiar history of name reassignment along with strict naming conventions suggests households sharing a surname within the same municipality can be confidently identified as members of the same family line, which allows identification of kinship networks. In the Philippines, collective action capacity increases the level of NPA control in villages with a history of state neglect, while the effect declines as the quality of local governance increases, consistent with the theory. I investigate potential threats to the inferences associated with endogeneity bias and test the theory’s mechanisms by investigating the relationship between collective action capacity and rebel governance in qualitative data collected in a Key-Informant survey of local leaders in 75 randomly selected villages within 3 conflict-affected provinces (Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Compostela Valley) on the island of Mindanao. I present plausible alternative theories, consistent with the econometric results, and draw competing hypotheses regarding variation in rebel governance. I use the interview data in process-tracing and case comparison methods to adjudicate between the accountability theory and these alternatives.
